Scalia Being Scalia
Apr 17 2007, 22:47 EDT [updated Apr 17 2007, 22:56 EDT]
Who said the law can't be fun? Here is a lengthy excerpt from Justice Scalia's recent dissent (joined by Thomas, Souter, and Roberts).
    In order to contort the statute’s language beyond recognition, the Court must believe Congress’s intent so crystalline, the spirit of its legislation so glowingly bright, that the statutory text should simply not be read to say what it says. Justice Stevens is quite candid on the point: He is willing to contradict the text. But [his] candor should not make his philosophy seem unassuming. He maintains that it is "a correct performance of the judicial function" to "override a strict interpretation of the text" so long as policy-driven interpretation "is faithful to the intent of Congress."
and he's just getting warmed up.
    But once one departs from "strict interpretation of the text” (by which Justice Stevens means the actual meaning of the text) fidelity to the intent of Congress is a chancy thing. The only thing we know for certain both Houses of Congress (and the President, if he signed the legislation) agreed upon is the text. Legislative history can never produce a "pellucidly clear" picture of what a law was "intended" to mean, for the simple reason that it is never voted upon— or ordinarily even seen or heard—by the "intending" lawgiving entity, which consists of both Houses of Congress and the President (if he did not veto the bill). See U. S. Constitution, Article I.
Translation: when you are elected to congress feel free to write laws but until then go soak your head.
    Justice Stevens takes comfort in the fact that this is a case in which he "cannot imagine anyone accusing any Member of the Court of voting one way or the other because of that Justice’s own policy preferences." I can readily imagine it ... Why should we suppose that in matters more likely to arouse the judicial libido—voting rights, antidiscrimination laws, or environmental protection, to name only a few—a judge in the School of Textual Subversion would not find it convenient (yea, righteous!) to assume that Congress must have meant, not what it said, but what he knows to be best?
Read the whole thing (the dissent starts on page 31). It is full of dry jabs at the majority's justifications of why what it wants is a truer version of the law than the one congress actually wrote. As the above "libido" comment suggests the law they are debating is petty and dry (it is about the math formulas used in a corner of federal education funding) but if justices are willing to fudge on such a small issue how can we trust them to adhere to the law on larger issues?

Later he also points out that this isn't just an issue for congress and the courts but for the people too. If the law doesn't mean what it says how can people obey it? If the law is a regulation how can people plan their business to comply with a secret meaning?

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